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Abstract 
Household food security, which may be compromised by short-term income shocks, is 
a key determinant of health. Since 2012, the UK witnessed marked increases in the rate 
of ‘sanctions’ applied to unemployment insurance claimants, which stop payments to 
claimants for a minimum of four weeks. In 2013, over 1 million sanctions were applied, 
potentially leaving people facing economic hardship and driving them to use food 
banks. Here we test this hypothesis by linking data from the Trussell Trust Foodbank 
Network with records on sanctioning rates across 259 local authorities in the UK. After 
accounting for local authority differences and time trends, as the rate of sanctioning 
increased by 10 per 100,000 adults, the rate of adults fed by foodbanks by an additional 
3.36 adults per 100,000 (95% CI: 1.71 to 5.01). The availability of food distribution 
sites affected how tightly sanctioning and food bank usage were associated (p<0.001 
for interaction term), such that in areas with few distribution sites, rising sanctions led 
to smaller increases in Trussell Trust food bank usage. Sanctioning appears to be 
closely linked with rising need for emergency food assistance, but the impact of 
sanctioning on food insecurity is likely not fully reflected in available data. There is a 
need to monitor household food insecurity in the UK to fully understand the impact of 
government policies on this outcome. 
Keywords: food bank, social security, benefit sanctions, household food insecurity
   






Household food security—that is, secure access to adequate food at all times--is a crucial 
determinant of population health (Seligman and Schillinger, 2010). Health outcomes associated 
with experiences of insecure access to food include poor nutritional status, depression and 
anxiety, and the inability to manage diet-related disease conditions, among others (Heflin et 
al., 2005; Kirkpatrick and Tarasuk, 2008; Seligman et al., 2010; Tarasuk et al., 2015).  
Insufficient and insecure household incomes, particularly short-term income losses, put 
households at risk of food insecurity (Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2013; Leete and Bania, 2010). A 
growing body of evidence shows how government policies can either increase or reduce secure 
access to food by changing access to social security income (Loopstra et al., 2015a; Ionescu-
Ittu et al., 2015; McIntyre et al., 2016). Here, we examine one aspect of social security policy, 
the practice of ‘sanctioning’, which abrogates financial support to unemployed persons if they 
fail to meet criteria for seeking work. We ask, does temporarily stopping people’s social 
security payments drive them to food banks? 
Internationally, there has been increasing experimentation with using punitive measures to 
incentivise changes in behaviour among social security recipients. Sanctioning policies vary 
across countries, but generally, governments use the threat of sanctioning (and the sanctions 
themselves) to incentivise unemployed persons to seek employment and reduce potential 
gaming behaviour (Watts et al., 2014; Venn, 2012). The reasons for receiving a sanction 
include showing up late to meetings with work coaches, missing job interviews, failing to 
participate in prescribed work programmes or training, and failing to show adequate evidence 
of job search activity, among others. Sanctioning penalties also vary widely, with some 
resulting in a reduced income payment for only 1-2 weeks, while in other countries, such as 
the UK, payments are cut-off altogether for a minimum of 4 weeks (Venn, 2012). 
The outcomes of sanctioning policies have been widely debated (Watts et al., 2014). Some 
argue the threat of sanctions motivate people return to work and increase chances of finding 
new employment. Yet, quantitative studies examining employment outcomes have found 
mixed results, potentially because they increase the quantity not the quality of the job search 
(Arni et al., 2013; Webster, 2016; Boockmann et al., 2014; Lalive et al., 2005; van der Klaauw 
and Van Ours, 2013). Others have questioned the fairness of the practice, given evidence that 
disadvantaged groups, such as those with disabilities, are more likely to be sanctioned than 
others (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015). 
Little research has been done on the health and social consequences of sanctioning, and in 
particular, on whether or not sanctioning increases risk of household food insecurity. Some 
studies on sanctioning practices and welfare reform in the US have suggested that benefit 
recipients who experienced sanctions were more likely to experience of food insecurity, among 
other hardships (Reichman et al., 2005), but comparable studies in Europe have not been 
conducted. Given that sanctioning is now considered integral to many Western nations’ social 
security approaches, it is critical to understand how this practice impacts access to food. 
Here we take advantage of the introduction of policy changes to sanctioning and welfare 
conditionality in the UK to test the hypothesis that sanctioning increases risks of hunger, as 
reflected in rates of people seeking emergency food assistance. 
Sanctioning and the rise of food banks in the UK 
   





As a result of the 2012 Welfare Reform Act, over 2012 and 2013, the UK Coalition government 
tightened the criteria for receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (the main UK unemployment 
insurance programme) as well as the consequences for failing to fulfil them (sanctioning). 
When people fail to meet the criteria, sanctioning occurs, which means claimants have their 
benefit payments stopped, with immediate effect, for a minimum of 4 weeks. For more serious 
offences, in 2013, penalty periods were extended to 13 weeks, or 26 weeks and 156 weeks for 
second and third failures, respectively (Department of Work and Pensions, 2013).   
Reflecting these changes, the monthly rates of sanctions applied to claimants nearly doubled 
between 2009 and 2013, with about 3% of claimants sanctioned each month in 2009 to over 
6% of claimants sanctioned every month in 2013 (Figure 1). In 2013, over 1 million sanctions 
were applied.  
 [Figure 1 here] 
In parallel with rising sanctions, the UK experienced a dramatic rise in food bank usage. In 
2011, the Trussell Trust Foodbank Network, the largest food bank network in the UK, reported 
about 129,000 users. By 2014/15, the number had climbed to almost 1.1 million (The Trussell 
Trust, 2015). An All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry conducted during 2014 found that many 
frontline emergency food providers reported sanctioning to be a major reason why people seek 
emergency food assistance (Forsey, 2014), and further investigation among food bank users 
found that sanctioning had affected 20-30% of people seeking emergency food assistance 
(Perry et al., 2014).  
Yet, this evidence is contested. In a House of Commons debate in 2015, the previous Minister 
for Employment, Priti Patel, stated that “there is no robust evidence that directly links 
sanctions and food bank use” because the “reasons for food bank use are complex and 
overlapping” (HC Debate 22 June 2015 vol 595 c608). Previous studies and evidence reviews, 
which rely on cross-sectional and anecdotal data, have been unable to disentangle whether 
there is a dynamic and systematic relationship between sanctioning rates and food bank usage 
(Forsey, 2014; Loopstra et al., 2015b; Perry et al., 2014). Without longitudinal data, this 
debate is difficult to resolve.  
Hence, in this paper we test the hypothesis that sanctioning rates and food bank usage in the 
UK are dynamically related. To fill this critical gap in the evidence base, we compiled a novel 
database linking quarterly sanctioning rates in local authorities to area-level food bank usage 
data from the Trussell Trust Network over fiscal years 2012 to 2015. We additionally 
incorporated data on Network characteristics to understand how the provision of food 
assistance influences the sanctioning-food bank usage relationship. We draw on these data to 
ask, how do rates of sanctioning vary with rates of food bank usage? We also explore if declines 
in number of sanctions have meant fewer people needing food assistance. Lastly, we examine 
how the availability of Trussell Trust assistance affects the relationship between sanctioning 
and food bank usage. Specifically, we investigate whether the impact of sanctioning on food 
insecurity may not be reflected in Trussell Trust food bank usage figures where their food 
banks are less available, thereby providing evidence that the true impact of sanctioning on 
hunger is potentially obscured by the data available.   
 Methods 
Source of Data 
   





We collected data on food bank usage from the Trussell Trust Foodbank Network, an umbrella 
organisation for 424 member food banks in the UK, comprised of over 2000 distribution sites 
in churches or community centres (The Trussell Trust, 2016). While there are numerous food 
banks that operate independently in the UK, the Trussell Trust is the only franchise model, 
creating a source of comparative and harmonised data. Each member food bank is responsible 
for obtaining referrals from local social service agencies. Referred persons receive a food 
parcel meant to provide three days’ worth of food for all household members.  
Data from referral vouchers are entered into the central Trussell Trust database. We received 
access to aggregated data from each food bank in the network, collated on a quarterly basis for 
fiscal years 2012/13 to 2015/16. These data provide the number of instances adults and children 
received food parcels, reflecting usage volume rather than number of individuals served. The 
number of unique individuals helped by Trussell Trust food banks has not been tracked. We 
use the number of adults fed scaled relative to the size of local adult population, but these 
numbers cannot be interpreted as a quarterly prevalence rate, as some individuals may have 
received food parcels on more than one occasion in the same quarter. 
We also obtained information on food bank postcodes, the year food banks were initiated, the 
number of distribution sites affiliated with the food bank, and the hours of operation at each 
distribution site from the Trussell Trust to enable description of area-level food bank 
operations.  
Sanctioning and Unemployment Data 
We obtained government data for local authorities in the UK on the number of people claiming 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, the number of sanctions applied to Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants, 
unemployment and employment rates, deprivation ranking (England only), rural-urban 
classification (England only) and population size from Nomis, Stat Xplore, and UK 
Government Statistics databases. Sanction data are the number of sanctions applied to 
claimants, summed over the months in each quarter, which were available up to the second 
quarter of 2015/16. Similar to food bank data, these do not pertain to individuals, so the same 
claimant could have received more than one sanction in the same quarter. Monthly claimant 
data were averaged over the quarter to provide an estimate of the quarterly claimant count. 
Unemployment and employment data are aggregated data from the Annual Population Survey. 
At the local authority level, Nomis provides data for 12-month periods beginning every quarter.  
Analytic sample 
We restricted our sample to local authorities in Scotland, Wales, and England, as sanctioning 
data were unavailable for Northern Ireland. We excluded five local authorities with small 
population sizes (City of London, Isles of Scilly, Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands, and Eilean 
Siar). Food bank postcodes were used to link food banks to their respective local authority 
areas, resulting in a sum of the total number fed, sum of distribution sites operating, and sum 
of total operating hours for the local authority that varied across quarters. We excluded food 
banks and corresponding local authorities which did not consistently collect data each quarter 
over 2012/13 until the end of 2015/16 (n= 15) and also those authorities in which Trussell Trust 
food banks do not operate (n= 101). This yielded a final analytical dataset of 259 local 
authorities spanning 16 quarters (Web Figure A2). Descriptive statistics showing rates of 
   





feeding and the number of food banks operating for local authorities over time are shown in 
Web Table A1 and in Web Figure A3.  
Statistical Analysis 
First, we examined how the rate of sanctions applied in local authority populations relates to 
food parcel distribution. We use a fixed effects model to control for unobserved differences 
across local authorities and time, asking if the instances of adults receiving food assistance is 
dynamically related to the number of sanctions applied in the population, as follows:  
Fedit= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Sanctionsit+𝛽2Claimantsit+ β3Season + β4First + β5Distributionit + β6Hoursit + μ𝑖   
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡    
Here, i denotes the local authority and t denotes the time point. Fed is the quarterly number of 
instances adults received food parcels per 100,000 adults in the population. Sanctions is the 
number of sanctions applied per 100,000 adults, and Claimants is the number of Jobseeker’s 
Allowance claimants per 100,000 working age adults. Season is a dummy variable for first, 
second, third, and fourth quarters to account for seasonal trends in food parcel distribution. 
First is a dummy variable denoting the first quarter a food bank opened in local authorities if 
they opened after April 2012. Distribution is the number of food bank distribution sites 
operating in local authority. Hours is the total number of hours food banks open per week. μ𝑖 
denotes local-authority fixed effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error term. In subsequent models, we 
include an adjustment for linear and quadratic time trends to account for secular trends in the 
numbers fed, sanctions applied, and Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants across the UK over this 
time period. 
Next, using a first difference model, we unpacked whether increasing sanctions from the 
previous quarter is associated with an increase in adult food bank usage, and in turn, whether 
a decline in the number of sanctions is associated with a decline in adult food bank usage, thus 
testing the acute dynamic relationship from quarter to quarter in numbers fed in relation to 
number of sanctions applied. To do this, we created two time-varying measures of sanctions: 
one capturing increases from the previous quarter and the other decreases. For each, changes 
in the opposite directions were coded as zero.  
Lastly, we explored the potential problem of hidden hunger, whereby, for a given increase in 
the number of sanctions applied, the extent to which this may lead to food insecurity is not 
fully reflected in food bank usage. In places where sanctions have increased, people who 
experience food insecurity as a result may not be able to reach food banks where food banks 
are less available; this would temper an observed relationship between sanctions and food bank 
usage, resulting in a downward bias in our estimate of the impact of sanctions. To investigate 
this, we examined the interaction between change in the number of sanctions applied, with the 
level of food bank operations in a given local authority-year, namely the number of distribution 
sites and the number of operating hours.  
Results 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between the rate of sanctions applied in local authorities and the 
rate of adults fed for one quarter, January to March 2014. Here, we see evidence that in places 
where the rate of sanctioning was higher, the rate of adult food bank usage was also higher 
(r=0.26; p=<0.0001). 
   





[Figure 2 here] 
In Table 1, we show how quarterly rates of food bank usage among adults related to the number 
of sanctions applied in the population each quarter over 2012 to 2015, after accounting for local 
authority differences. We found that for every 10 sanctions applied per 100,000 in the 
population, the rate of adult food bank users was 6.44 per 100,000 adults higher (95% CI: 4.72 
to 8.15). This association remained robust after adjusting for the scale of food bank operations 
and how long food banks had been operating (Table 1, Model 2). Lastly, we adjusted for linear 
and quadratic time trends. Though attenuated, the relationship between sanctioning and food 
bank use remained strong: for every 10 additional sanctions applied, the rate of food bank users 
per 100,000 was about 3.36 higher (95% CI: 1.71 to 5.01). 
[Table 1 here] 
To put these figures in context, rates of sanctioning applied in local populations rose from a 
mean of 302 per 100,000 adults over the April to June quarter of 2012/13 to 340 per 100,000 
over the July to September quarter of 2013/14. Our model predicts this increase in JSA 
sanctioning would account for about 5-10% of the increase in the rate of food bank usage 
observed over this period.  
When we delineated the effects of acute increases in sanctions applied from the previous 
quarter from acute declines (Table 2), we observed that for increases in sanctions, specifically, 
every 10 more sanctions applied was associated with about 5 more adults fed in food banks 
(95% CI: 3.00 to 7.40). A decline of 10 sanctions from the previous quarter was associated 
with a decline of about 2 adults fed (95% CI: -3.23 to -0.34). . 
[Table 2 here] 
Lastly, we examined how the dynamic relationship between change in sanctions applied and 
change in the number of adults fed was affected by the scale of food bank operations in local 
authorities (Web Table A2). The number of distribution sites available in local authorities 
significantly modified the observed relationship between the change in sanctions and the 
change in numbers fed. This is illustrated in Figure 3. In local authorities with few distribution 
sites per capita (< 1 per 100,000), if the number of sanctions increased by 20 per 100,000, there 
was not a corresponding significant increase in the number of adult food bank users. But for 
local authorities with 5 distribution sites or more operating per 100,000, an increase in 20 
sanctions per 100,000 related to an estimated increase of about 10 more adult food bank users. 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We performed a series of sensitivity analyses to assess the robustness of our models to alternate 
specifications. To test the possibility that the association between sanctions and food bank use 
was spurious, driven by higher rates of unemployment, we additionally adjusted our models 
for employment and unemployment rates and found our results unchanged (Web Table A4). 
We also checked for outliers (i.e. observations with residuals > |2SD|) and extreme 
observations to ensure our estimates were not being driven by these observations. No 
observations met our criteria of outliers. After removing observations with extreme quarterly 
changes in rates of feeding (i.e. > the 99th percentile), our results were unchanged (Web Table 
A5). We also re-ran our models using a random effects framework and adjusting for time-
invariant characteristics, specifically Index of Multiple Deprivation and rural-urban 
   





classification. Due to these variables only being available for England, these models were only 
conducted among local authorities from these areas (Web Table A6). We found that results 
from these models were consistent with our fixed-effect models.  
Discussion 
Our findings suggest a strong, dynamic relationship exists between the number of sanctions 
applied in local authorities and the number of adults receiving emergency food parcels. As the 
quarterly rate of sanctioning rose in local authorities, the rate of adult food bank users also rose. 
We observed that a quarter-to-quarter increase of 10 sanctions per 100,000 was associated with 
about 5 more instances of adults needing food, while a decline in 10 sanctions applied was 
associated with about 2 fewer instances of adults needing food. We also observed that the extent 
to which sanctioning is reflected in demand for food assistance from the Trussell Trust depends 
on availability of distribution sites in a given area. Where distribution sites were not widely 
available to the population to use (as measured by distribution sites per capita), there was not 
a corresponding increase in the numbers fed, even if more people were sanctioned.  
Our study uses the best current data available to examine the relationship between sanctioning 
and food bank usage. The findings were robust to a number of alternate model specifications, 
providing clear evidence of a link between area-level sanctioning rates and food bank usage. 
We were limited to using data at the area level, however, so our results could be vulnerable to 
ecological fallacy, where rates of sanctioning correlate with food bank usage, but do not mean 
that the people sanctioned are the same individuals who show up in food banks. Our area level 
findings are consistent with those observed among individuals in reports from frontline food 
assistance providers and qualitative studies, however (Forsey, 2014; Perry et al., 2014).  
Sanction data are limited by how they are recorded. While the government provides 
information on claims where adverse and non-adverse decisions were made and whether the 
decision was based on an original decision, mandatory reconsideration, or appeal, they do not 
provide information on the total number of original adverse decisions. These data would be 
important for tracking the impact of sanctions in a given quarter because during the 
reconsideration and appeals process, claimants have their benefit payments stopped; the month 
that an appeals decision is recorded could be one or two months after a claimant first had his/her 
payments stopped. We based our data on original adverse decisions because we could not know 
with certainty that claimants had sanctions applied in these months, but using only these figures 
mean our estimates have likely underestimated the impact of sanctioning on food bank usage. 
Data on the number of people receiving Universal Credit, a new benefit in the UK subject to 
conditionality, are also not available, which also means the full impact of sanctioning practices 
on food bank usage cannot be charted. 
Despite these data limitations, this study significantly builds upon previous studies to fill a 
critical gap in the literature. The positive relationship we observed between sanctioning rates 
and food bank use is consistent with previous work examining annual rates of sanctioning and 
foodbank use, but extends beyond this work by using robust models to provide evidence of a 
strong and consistent relationship over time that is consistent with (but does not necessarily 
establish) a causal explanation.  In addition, while other studies conducted among food bank 
users have highlighted that there is a high prevalence of sanctioning among them, our study 
takes a systematic approach and considers the counterfactual: are there also places where there 
are high rates of sanctioning, but no food bank usage? Our models suggested that this might be 
   





the case where food aid distribution is limited, highlighting the possibility of hidden hunger, 
namely people who lack both access to food financially and who cannot access emergency food 
assistance. 
Our results intervene in the ongoing debate about the drivers of rising food bank usage. 
Government officials have suggested sanctions have no impact on food bank use according to 
the evidence available (HC Debate 22 June 2015 vol 595 c608). Here, we have shown a robust 
link between sanctioning and food bank usage. Our findings are consistent with the evidence 
gathered through the All-Party Parliamentary Group Inquiry into Hunger and Food Bank Usage 
that sanctioning is resulting in individuals not having enough money for basic necessities, such 
as food (Forsey, 2014; All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Hunger and Food Poverty, 2014).  
This has important policy implications. The recent decline in sanctioning is a positive sign, and 
has likely contributed to the decline in the numbers of people using food banks within local 
authorities in 2015/16. Yet, in 2015, there were still about 358,000 sanctions applied to JSA 
claimants. We also observed that declines in sanctioning were not as strongly linked to declines 
in food bank usage, explaining why the decline in food bank usage has not been as fast as the 
decline in sanctions. This could be because experiences of sanctions trigger longer-term 
financial crises, such as debt accumulation. A recent report from one Trussell Trust Foodbank 
(West Cheshire) found that people who received food bank referrals for the reason of being 
sanctioned were more likely to have crises that lasted for 3 months or more (Garratt et al., 
2016). These findings support recommendations for the government to consider whether 
stopping basic income payments for vulnerable, out-of-work groups is a fair penalty, or 
whether the long-shadow of the harms associated with this practice (e.g. food insecurity) 
outweigh any positive outcome of sanctioning. With the introduction of in-work conditionality 
for Universal Credit claimants, there is also concern that more people will be exposed to 
sanctions, making these findings highly relevant to an increasing number of benefit claimants 
in the UK (Welfare Conditionality, 2016).  
Our results also have relevance for the providers of charitable food assistance and the wider 
problem of food insecurity in the UK. Trussell Trust data likely only capture a proportion of 
people who experience food insecurity; our results suggest there could be hidden hunger due 
to sanctioning in places where Trussell Trust food banks are not available. People in these areas 
may instead seek help from other agencies or non-Trussell Trust food banks, but these numbers 
are not reflected in Trussell Trust data, currently the only indicator of hunger in the UK, despite 
known limitations of this measure (Loopstra and Tarasuk, 2015). A recent Gallup World Poll 
conducted in the UK indicated that up to 8.5 million people experienced food insecurity in 
2014 (Taylor and Loopstra, 2016). In contrast, Trussell Trust estimated that 500,000 
individuals were using their food banks in the same year, potentially underestimating the 
problem of food insecurity by about 17 times. This disconnect highlights how important it is 
for the UK to implement household food insecurity monitoring. Such monitoring is vital to 
understand how changes to income support, employment, and other macroeconomic trends 
impact on vulnerability to hunger 
Our findings also highlight the limitations of any charitable food support network’s ability to 
eradicate food insecurity. These networks are increasingly relied upon to fill in the gaps in 
welfare support but, by relying on volunteers and donated food and space to operate, they will 
vary in their capacity to address hunger in their area. As such, they are not equipped to address 
   





these gaps in every part of the country and are less able to respond quickly to changes in need. 
Food banks are not an adequate solution to the problem of hunger, and they should not become 
an informal substitution for the social safety net.  
These observations point to several directions for future research. The incorporation of 
household food insecurity and food bank usage monitoring into routine surveys conducted in 
the UK would enable individual analyses of the causes and consequences of these experiences. 
There is also a need for harmonised data collection across short-term providers of emergency 
assistance to enable better identification of where there may be gaps in the provision of 
emergency support and to enable evaluation of this support on the wider problem of food 
insecurity. Lastly, food bank usage is one possible harm associated with sanctioning, but other 
potential outcomes include declines in mental health, debt, and even death (Gentleman, 2014). 
Longitudinal studies of benefit claimants would enable better understanding of how prevalent 
sanctioning is and what types of outcomes are associated with this practice.   
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Figure 1 Average monthly rates of sanctioning among Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants 
sanctioned each quarter over 2011 to 2015. 
 
Notes: Graph shows number of original sanction decisions resulting in a sanction as 
proportion of number of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance in England, Scotland, and 

























































































































































































































































































   





Figure 2 Relationship between sanctions applied and numbers of adult food bank users across 
local authorities with food banks, Jan-Mar 2014. 
 
   





Figure 3 Relationship between sanctioning and adult food bank usage by concentration of 
food bank distribution centres in local authorities. 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates decrease and increase from mean sanction rate of 200 applied per 
100,000. High number of distribution sites refers to areas with 5 or more sites per 100,000 
and low number of distribution sites refers to areas with <1 site per 100,000 in areas with 
food banks present. P value for interaction of change in sanctions with high distribution sites 
vs. low = 0.011. For full model see Web Table A3.  
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Table 1 Relationship between sanctions applied and number of adult food bank users in local 
authorities with food banks, 2012-2015. 
 Adult food bank users each quarter per 100,000 adults 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per 10 additional 
sanctions per 100,000 
adults 
6.44*** 6.35*** 3.36*** 
(0.87) (0.87) (0.84) 
Per 10 additional JSA 
claimants per 100,000 
adults 
-1.81*** -1.73*** -0.76** 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) 
Distribution sites per 
100,000 persons 
--- 43.9*** 33.6** 
 (12.5) (12.3) 
Weekly hours of operation 
per 100,000 persons 
--- -5.22 -4.46 
 (3.17) (3.11) 
Linear and quadratic time 
trends 
No No Yes 
Local authority-quarters 3041 3041 3041 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variable for season, 
dummy variable for first quarter a food bank operated, and local authority fixed effects. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
   





Table 2 Dynamic relationship between the change in number of sanctions applied from 
quarter-to-quarter and change in numbers using food banks. 
 Change in number of adult food 
bank users from previous quarter 
 (1) (2) 












Per 1 additional distribution site per 
100,000 from previous quarter 
6.72* 6.28 
(3.28) (3.24) 
Per 1 additional hour open per week per 
100,000 from previous quarter 
-0.33 -0.32 
(0.43) (0.44) 
Local authority-quarters 2918 2918 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include linear and quadratic time trends, 
and dummy variables for season and first quarter a food bank operated.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Web Figure A1 Monthly average rate of sanctions applied to claimants over quarter as a 
proportion of total Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants. 
 
Source: DWP Stat-Xplore and Nomis.web.  Figures show number of original decisions 
resulting in a sanction applied as a proportion of people claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance each 











































































































   





Web Figure A2 Relationship between Trussell Trust foodbanks and local authorities in 




   


































Local authorities with constant number of foodbanks
from 2011/12 forward
Local authorities where number of foodbanks grew
after 2011
Local authorities with first foodbanks opening in
2012/13
Local authorities with first foodbanks opening in
2013/14
Local authorities with first foodbanks opening in
2014/15
Local authorities with first foodbanks opening in
2015/16
   













Number of food 
banks per local 
authority 
Number of food banks 
per 100,000 in local 
population 
People fed each 
quarter as proportion 
of local population 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Apr 2012 114 138 1.21 0.87 0.74 0.37 0.24 0.22 
Jul 2012 136 165 1.21 0.90 0.76 0.38 0.26 0.25 
Oct 2012 178 221 1.24 0.83 0.80 0.42 0.34 0.31 
Jan 2013 191 240 1.26 0.85 0.81 0.42 0.39 0.32 
Apr 2013 214 278 1.30 0.86 0.86 0.47 0.46 0.37 
Jul 2013 225 301 1.34 0.88 0.90 0.49 0.54 0.40 
Oct 2013 239 336 1.41 0.96 0.92 0.52 0.65 0.48 
Jan 2014 244 350 1.43 1.02 0.93 0.53 0.66 0.53 
Apr 2014 250 361 1.44 1.04 0.94 0.53 0.55 0.43 
Jul 2014 254 372 1.46 1.05 0.95 0.54 0.59 0.48 
Oct 2014 255 379 1.49 1.08 0.96 0.55 0.69 0.55 
Jan 2015 256 385 1.50 1.08 0.97 0.54 0.61 0.49 
Apr 2015 258 388 1.50 1.08 0.97 0.54 0.53 0.42 
Jul 2015 259 390 1.51 1.10 0.98 0.54 0.58 0.43 
Oct 2015 259 392 1.51 1.10 0.98 0.54 0.66 0.44 
Jan 2016 259 392 1.51 1.10 0.98 0.54 0.60 0.40 






   





Web Table A2 Interactions between level of food bank operations in local authorities and 
change in sanctions applied in relation to change in number of adult food bank users. 
 Change in number of adult food bank users 
from previous quarter 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per 10 additional sanctions applied 
from previous quarter 
2.40*** 1.56* 2.16*** 
(0.51) (0.64) (0.55) 
Per 10 additional JSA claimants from 
previous quarter 
-0.050 -0.038 -0.045 
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Distribution sites per 100,000 1.78*** 2.21*** 1.78*** 
(0.50) (0.58) (0.52) 
Weekly hours of operation per 
100,000 
-0.10 -0.11 -0.082 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Change in sanctions* Distribution 
sites 
--- 0.20* --- 
 (0.096)  
Change in sanctions * Weekly hours 
of operation 
--- --- 0.012 
  (0.0075) 
Local authority-quarters 2918 2918 2918 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variables for season and 
first quarter a food bank operated, and for the number of months food banks were operating.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
   





Web Table A3 Model matching Figure 3 interaction model using categorical number of 
distribution sites. 
 
 Change in number of adult food bank 
users from previous quarter  
Per 10 sanctions applied per 100,000 adults 0.46* 
 (0.23) 
























Per 10 additional JSA claimants from previous quarter 0.15 
(0.33) 
Weekly hours of operation per 100,000 -0.0069 
 (0.069) 
Local authority-quarters 2918 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variables for season and 
first quarter a food bank operated.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
   





Web Table A4 Sensitivity analysis: relationship between sanctions applied and number of 
adult food bank users in local authorities with food banks after adjustment for employment 
and unemployment. 
 Number of adult food bank users each quarter per 
100,000 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Per 10 additional sanctions per 
100,000  
2.92*** 2.90*** 2.93*** 
(0.80) (0.80) (0.80) 
Per 10 additional JSA claimants 
per 100,000 adults 
-0.54* -0.56* -0.53* 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
Per 10 additional unemployed 
adults per 100,000  
 0.026 --- 
--- (0.029)  
Per 10 additional employed adults 
per 100,000 adults in labour 
market 
  0.013 
--- --- (0.020) 
Local authority-quarters 2690 2690 2690 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variable for season, 
dummy variable for first quarter a food bank operated, number of distribution sites per capita, 
hours of operation per capita, linear and quadratic time trends, and local authority fixed 
effects. Constant not shown. 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
   





Web Table A5 Dynamic relationship between numbers of sanctions applied from quarter-to-
quarter and change in numbers using food banks excluding extreme observations. 
 Change in number of adult food bank users from 
previous quarter 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Per 10 additional sanctions 
applied from previous quarter 
5.20*** 4.35** --- --- 
(1.12) (1.45)   
Per 10 fewer sanctions applied 
from previous quarter 
--- --- -1.79* -2.42*** 
  (0.73) (0.61) 
Extreme observations removed No Yes No Yes 
Local authority-quarters 2918 2887 2918 2886 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Extreme observations denotes those with quarterly 
changes of values > 99th percentile. Models include dummy variables for season and first 
quarter a food bank operated, change in number of distribution sites, change in hours of 
operation, and change in number of claimants not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
   





Web Table A6 Relationship between sanctions applied and number of adult food bank users 
in English local authorities with food banks using random effects framework and accounting 
for Index of Multiple Deprivation and rural-urban classification, 2012-2015. 
 Number of adult food bank users each quarter per 100,000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Per 10 additional sanctions 
per 100,000 adults 
2.92** 2.88** 2.87** 2.27* 
(0.95) (0.94) (0.95) (0.98) 
Per 10 additional JSA 
claimants per 100,000 adults 
-0.40 -0.59* -0.57* -0.57* 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) 
Distribution sites per 
100,000 
26.2** 25.8** 26.0** 26.1** 
(8.19) (8.12) (7.97) (8.11) 
Weekly hours of operation 
per 100,000 
-0.93 -0.79 -0.78 -0.77 
(1.90) (1.96) (1.90) (1.90) 
Months with food banks 
operating 
3.55** 3.61** 3.41** 3.42** 
(1.28) (1.18) (1.06) (1.07) 
Deprivation rank (326=most 
deprived) 
--- 1.31** 1.23* 1.33** 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) 
Rural classification      
Mainly Rural 
 
--- --- Referent Referent 
Largely Rural --- --- -63.3 -62.7 
  (58.2) (58.5) 
Urban with Significant 
Rural  
--- --- 48.7 51.6 
  (63.3) (63.6) 
Urban with City and Town    --- --- 100.9 103.8 
  (71.1) (71.5) 
Urban with Minor 
Conurbation   
--- --- -73.2 -66.8 
  (92.3) (92.4) 
Urban with Major 
Conurbation 
--- --- -25.5 -21.4 
  (66.9) (67.3) 
Linear and quadratic time 
trends 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Dummy variable for time No No No Yes 
Local authority-quarters 2502 2502 2502 2502 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Models include dummy variable for season, 
dummy variable for first quarter a food bank operated, linear and quadratic time trends. 
Constant not shown. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
